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As the economy continues on its almost decade-long expansion, pro s-
perity and poverty exist side by side, with an increasing gap between
rich and poor. While the net worth of the wealthiest Americans soars
with the stock market and income for the highly skilled climbs, the
value of assets and income of families at the low end of the income scale
have fallen or stagnated. It is true that the poverty rate has declined
somewhat since 1993, but it has not fallen below the 12 percent level, as
it did in previous expansions, and it is worse than in 1969, the year the
previous record-setting expansion ended.
Economists blame the increasing inequality on a shift in demand from
low-skill to high-skill labor, but the evidence for this hypothesis is
mixed. Another explanation that warrants investigation is the weaken-
ing of labor market institutions that affect the wage structure and in the
past have been capable of boosting wages. Over recent decades the
strength of unions has declined and the minimum wage has fallen rela-
tive to purchasing power and to average wages. Any serious analysis of
inequality should therefore include an examination of these institutions.
Resident Scholar Oren M. Levin-Waldman does just that, using census
data on wage earners from 1940 to 1990. He finds that institutional set-
ting, particularly unionization, has a significant impact on the percent-
age of heads of household earning close to the minimum wage. States
with relatively high union density and no right-to-work laws have the
lowest percentage of heads of household earning near the minimum
wage; states with right-to-work laws have relatively higher percentages
a4
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earning at that level. Education and industry type are factors in the like-
lihood of earning the minimum wage, but among workers with the same
low level of education and in a similar industry, those in right-to-work
states have a greater probability of earning close to the minimum wage
than those in states with relatively high union density.
The minimum wage and the earned income tax credit can be used to
prop up wages at the low end of the scale and thereby improve the distri-
bution of income. Levin-Waldman suggests that policymakers should
look to institutional structure as a means to reduce inequality and that
i n c reases in the minimum wage would be the most effective policy to
accomplish this goal.
I hope you find this research interesting, and I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
December 1999Public Policy Brief a6 a6
Debate about the minimum wage most often focuses narrowly on its pos-
sible effects on the small segment of the labor force (around 6 percent)
that earns the minimum wage, most of whom are teenagers (age 16 to
19). But if such a small segment of the labor market is earning the mini-
mum wage, why is it so significant in the public debate? The focus on
the small portion of workers who earn the minimum wage has obscured
the critical issue of the important effect the minimum wage has on the
l a rger number of workers who earn around the minimum wage and,
hence, on the distribution of income.
This brief expands the focus of the debate by discussing the effect the
minimum wage can have on workers earning around the minimum wage
and by demonstrating that institutions, such as the minimum wage,
unionization, and right-to-work laws, can affect not just those workers
directly earning the minimum wage or members of unions but the over-
all wage stru c t u re. This is demonstrated by showing that workers in
states with a high level of unionization have a lower probability of earn-
ing the minimum than workers in states with right-to-work laws, even
when market and educational factors are accounted for. 
If diff e rences in the institutional stru c t u re between states can have an
impact on the distribution of income in a particular state, then the fed-
eral government can use the minimum wage to achieve a more equitable
distribution of income. The minimum wage plays a crucial role for more
than just those who earn the minimum wage; it helps all low-wage work-
ers, especially those with only a high school education and those living
Do Institutions Affect the Wage
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in rural areas. The closer a wage floor is to either the average or median
wage of a particular community, the more of an impact it will have on
the overall wage stru c t u re of that community. Also the more people
e a rning around the wage floor in a community, the more politically
charged the issue is likely to be. Therefore, in states with lower wages,
the minimum wage elicits a degree of opposition far more intense than it
would if it affected only a small segment of the population.
The Limitations of Existing Studies on
D i s e mp l oyment Effe c t s
We can first look briefly at the findings that have emerged from the
usual focus of the debate—disemployment effects on minimum wage
earners. Empirical findings do not always support the theory of perfect
competition in labor markets (the currently predominant theory ) ,
which predicts that a minimum wage causes unemployment if it is
higher  than  the  equilibrium  wage.  According  to  this  theory,
in the absence of a wage floor, the market price (the wage) naturally
tends to an equilibrium defined as the level at which supply equals
demand and the wage equals the value of the marginal prod u c t
of labor. This theory is often used to support the idea that in an
u n regulated market all workers are paid what they are worth and
all workers who want a job at that wage can find one. If the minimum
wage is higher than the equilibrium wage, fewer workers will be hire d
at that wage than are willing to work for that wage. Employers will lay
off workers whose value is less than the minimum or will hire fewer low-
productivity workers (Stigler 1946; Ehrenberg and Smith 1997).
The effects of the minimum wage have been tested empirically by esti-
mating whether increases in the minimum wage are correlated with
i n c reases in unemployment. The results are mixed. Some literature
shows little or no disemployment effect, and much of the literature that
does show a disemployment effect suggests that that effect is primarily in
the teen labor market (Kosters and Welch 1972; Welch 1974, 1978;
Meyer and Wise 1983; Neumark and Wascher 1992). Card and Krueger
(1995, 1998) found no disemployment effect; quite the contrary,
employment in the states they examined rose. Do Institutions Affect the Wage Stru c t u re ?
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C a rd and Kru e g e r’s study may be limited because of its focus on the fast-
f o od industry, in which the labor market operates essentially as a
monopsony and, as such, is not re p resentative of the labor market as a
whole. In a monopsony, the employer (as the only buyer of labor) has
s u fficient market power to establish wage rates. The pro f i t - m a x i m i z i n g
wage and level of employment in a monopsonistic market are below the
equilibrium wage and level of employment in a perfectly competitive
market. Under these conditions, the effect of a minimum wage can be
exactly opposite to its effect in a competitive labor market, namely, an
i n c rease in employment, because it raises wages to more attractive lev-
els. As long as the minimum wage is not increased beyond the point at
which the monopsonist would demand less labor, the minimum wage
in the monopsony results in greater employment and eff i c i e n c y
(Houseman 1998).
In Levy Institute surveys of small businesses, only 6.2 percent of the 568
firms surveyed in 1998 reported that the recent increase in the minimum
wage to $5.15 per hour had affected their employment practices (Levin-
Waldman and McCarthy 1998) and only 13.4 percent of the 536 firms
s u rveyed in 1999 re p o rted that they would be affected by an incre a s e
in the minimum wage to $6.00 per hour (Levin-Waldman 1999b).
Although the actual behavior of firms when faced with the reality of an
increase may be different from their answers to hypothetical questions,
the responses in the survey do provide an indication of pre f e re n c e s
among small businesses.
One source of the discrepancy between the theoretical and empirical lit-
erature is problems with measurement practices and data sets. It is possi-
ble that we simply lack adequate data on the minimum wage and so
cannot say whether it will have the disemployment effects predicted by
m odels of perfectly competitive markets. To the extent that there are
employment consequences, they are often considered to be re l a t i v e l y
small (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982). Although studies such as Card
and Krueger’s show no disemployment effects following modest increases
in the minimum, it cannot be assumed that there would not be such
effects after larger increases. Critics of the minimum argue that the lack
of employment effects is probably due only to the fact that the wage is
still below market-clearing equilibrium. There is still a point at which
a8the minimum wage will bite into employment levels, but the data and
measures currently available do not tell us exactly what point that might
be (Freeman and Freeman 1991; Kennan 1995).
Who Earns the Minimum Wa ge ?
I n t e r p retation of studies of the characteristics of workers who earn the
minimum wage is open to contro v e r s y. The 1981 re p o rt of the Minimum
Wage Study Commission (MWSC), which forms the basis of the cur-
rent consensus on the minimum wage’s employment consequences,
noted that most minimum wage workers (68 percent) were in families
headed by married couples; 14 percent were the only earners in their
families and 54 percent were in families with two or more earners. The
re p o rt stated:
Although 17 percent of all families had minimum wage work-
ers, that figure can be misleading. Minimum wage workers
generally are not the primary earners in families with more
than one earn e r, and those families constitute more than half
of all U.S. families. When the wages of the workers in those
families were weighted to reflect the lower number of hours
generally worked by those at or below the minimum, the
number of such families with both husband and wife earn i n g
an average wage below the minimum became quite small.
(MWSC 1981, 13)
On the basis of these findings, it has come to be believed that most min-
imum wage earners are secondary earners and teenagers, and for this
reason teenagers have become the focus of the empirical literature
(Burkhauser and Finegan 1989; Kosters 1996).
Some researchers argue that the MWSC findings are misleading. Even if
it is true that most minimum wage earners are secondary earners, it does
not follow that their income is not necessary to the maintenance of the
household in which they live. More o v e r, they argue, most minimum
wage workers are not teenagers. For the period October 1995 to
September 1996, Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (1999, 189–190) found
that only 28.6 percent of the 9.9 million minimum wage workers were
Right-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and the Minimum Wage
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teenagers. They interpret this to mean that most minimum wage workers
are adults with economic responsibilities.
The Minimum Wa ge as a Re fe rence Po i n t: 
Wa ge Contour Theory
A more crucial question than who earns the statutory minimum is who
e a rns a wage close to the minimum wage. The claim that the level of
the minimum wage is unimportant because most people earn a higher
wage obscures the impact the minimum wage has on a range of wages
above and below it. It could well be that the minimum wage elicits the
opposition that it does not because so many workers earn it, but
because it has an impact on the wages of workers earning around it,
and especially above it (D. Gordon 1996). The impact is explicitly
analyzed in wage contour theory, first developed by John Dunlop
(1957). Dunlop suggested that the internal wage stru c t u re of a firm is
a ffected as much by external forces as internal ones. An economy’s
overall wage stru c t u re can be thought of as a series of wage contours—
defined as a range of wages earned by a group of workers with similar
characteristics and working in similar industries. In each industry there
is a key rate, changes in which affect the rates surrounding it, and that
key rate varies from industry to industry. Dunlop did not define a key
rate more specifically, but any rate serving as a re f e rence point within
an industry could constitute a key rate. Wage contour theory, in
essence, holds that wage rates are not established by a natural market-
place (a perfectly competitive market) but by institutions (an imper-
fectly competitive market). For example, the minimum wage or a
union wage may be the key rate in a particular wage contour. On this
basis, a strong argument can be made for defining the minimum wage
population as those earning around the statutory minimum wage, that
is, those earning a range of wages from some point below to some point
above it.
Spriggs and Klein’s (1994) study of the minimum wage appears to rein-
f o rce Dunlop’s wage contour theory. The study suggests that the mini-
mum wage’s importance lies in the role it serves in determining the
wages around it. Spriggs and Klein found that firms maintain their inter-
nal wage stru c t u re despite changes in the minimum wage, whether itRight-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and the Minimum Wage
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rises because of legislation or falls in real terms because it is held con-
stant in periods of inflation. Although minimum wage increases may
have some employment consequences, for the most part those conse-
quences are not significant. The important aspect of the minimum wage
is less its actual level than the fact that firms view it as a reference point
for what starting wages ought to be. If the minimum wage is, as Spriggs
and Klein suggest, a socially defined reference point, the implication is
e n o rmous. Pre s u m a b l y, that re f e rence point can be altered and once
altered will have an impact on those wages around it. If the minimum
wage can raise wages of all low-wage workers, any youth disemployment
effects might be a small price to pay.
Sta te Type and Regional Disparity in Income Dist ri b u t i o n
Many studies that explore the effects of changes in the minimum wage
cite wage and income data based on national averages. National 
averages, however, do not take into account regional diff e rences in
wages or cost of living. Congressional opposition to the minimum wage
has tended to be stronger in southern and western states, which have
lower average wages, lower standards of living, more workers earn i n g
a round the minimum wage, and laws hostile to unions (Levin-
Waldman 1999a). It has been assumed that wage rates are lower
because of economic diff e rences such as the presence of industries that
a re more labor intensive and inefficient (Coelho and Gladi 1971).
Such an assumption no doubt accords with the theory of competitive
markets, but it is not entirely supported by the evidence. In Lester’s
(1946, 1947) comparative studies of industries in the North and South,
he found that southern industries were no less efficient than nort h e rn
industries; he also found that after the federal minimum wage was
i n t roduced in 1938, North-South wage diff e rentials, especially in tex-
tiles, were reduced. He concluded that wage diff e rentials persisted
because of the absence in the South of institutions such as labor
unions. The question then is whether regional diff e rences can be
accounted for by economic diff e rences between regions or whether cul-
tural, demographic, political, and ideological factors (such as unioniza-
tion and political opposition to it) need to be taken into consideration.
If the latter, the effects of the minimum wage will vary depending on
the characteristics of a particular state.Do Institutions Affect the Wage Stru c t u re ?
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Recent studies have documented a growing inequality in the distribution
of wealth and income in the United States since the early 1970s
(Phillips 1990; Newman 1993; Hungerford 1993; Wolff 1994; Danziger
and Gottschalk 1995). Human capital theory argues that stru c t u r a l
changes in the economy have resulted in a mismatch between well-paid
jobs and workers’ skills; the labor market is divided into a primary mar-
ket in which skilled workers (the demand for whom is incre a s i n g )
receive a premium and a secondary market in which unskilled workers
(the supply of whom is abundant) are trapped in low-wage jobs (primar-
ily in the service sector). In other words, the growth in wage inequality
between the primary and secondary labor markets has been caused by
the increasing skills differential between the two (for example, Katz and
Murphy 1992; Krueger 1993). However, individuals can pass from the
secondary labor market into the primary market by upgrading their skills
through education and training. Labor market institutions, such as the
minimum wage and unions, are either irrelevant or counterprod u c t i v e
because they serve only to inflate wages beyond the equilibrium level.
In contrast, the theory of imperfectly competitive markets, from which
wage contour theory flows, suggests that growing inequality is due to a
shift in public policy and a corresponding decline in labor market insti-
tutions (Piore 1995; D. Gordon 1996; Galbraith 1998; Palley 1998).
F o rtin and Lemieux (1997), for instance, found that the decline in
union membership contributed to increased wage inequality among men,
and the decline in the real value of the minimum wage contributed to
increased wage inequality among women. 
The institutional stru c t u re (defined in terms of the minimum wage,
union density, and the attitude of the legal stru c t u re toward unionization)
varies by state. One can attempt to assess the impact of institutions on
the wage stru c t u re by seeing whether wages vary with institutional stru c-
t u re. Are there some states in which wages tend to be more stagnant than
in others? Do a greater portion of workers earn the minimum wage in
some states? Are these trends observable over time? Can these trends be
c o rrelated with institutional factors? To estimate the probability that an
individual worker will earn a wage around the minimum, we used demo-
graphic profiles drawn from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series,
or IPUMS (Ruggles and Sobek 1997), for 1940 (shortly after the federal
minimum wage was introduced in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938)Right-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and the Minimum Wage
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to 1990 (the most recent census). Earnings “around the minimum wage”
a re defined as from 50 percent below the statutory minimum wage to 50
p e rcent above.1 The IPUMS sample sizes are diff e rent for each census
y e a r, ranging from 1.5 million to 3 million individuals. From the data sets,
consisting of a household file and a personal file, we extracted data on
heads of household who are employed and who work for wages (as
opposed to salaries). Although this reduces the sample size, the number of
o b s e rvations still ranges from 225,000 in 1940 to over 660,000 in 1990.
To construct a model for analyzing diff e rences in wage stru c t u re acro s s
states, states are divided into three categories (Table 1 and Figure 1).
Table 1 State Types and Union Density (Percentage of Unionized
Wo r k e r s )
Right-to-Work High-Union-Density
States States Remaining States *
Alabama 13.6 Alaska 24.1 Colorado 9.9
Arizona  8.0 California  17.7 Delaware 13.0
Arkansas  7.8 Connecticut  20.2 Kentucky 12.6
Florida  7.3 District of Columbia  15.1 Maryland 14.9
Georgia  6.8 Hawaii  24.6 Missouri 14.6
Idaho  8.1 Illinois  20.2 New Hampshire 12.6
Iowa  12.1 Indiana  16.5 New Mexico 9.4
Kansas  10.2 Maine  15.6 Oklahoma 9.3
Louisiana  7.0 Massachusetts  16.2 Vermont 9.3
Mississippi  5.2 Michigan  23.7
Nebraska  9.1 Minnesota  20.3
Nevada  20.2 Montana 15.8
North Carolina  4.2 New Jersey  21.9
North Dakota  10.0 New York  27.7
South Carolina 3.3 Ohio  18.5
South Dakota  7.7 Oregon  20.1
Tennessee  9.5 Pennsylvania  18.9
Texas 6.5 Rhode Island  19.4
Utah  9.0 Washington  21.0
Virginia  6.7 West Virginia  16.3
Wyoming  11.2 Wisconsin  17.7
*Remaining states are neither right-to-work nor high-union-density states.
S o u rc e : Data from Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and
E a rnings Data Book: Compilations from the Current Population Survey 1996 Edition
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1996), Table 8.Do Institutions Affect the Wage Stru c t u re ?
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“Right-to-work states” are those that have right-to-work laws. These laws
a re assumed to be an indication that the state has legislation that in gen-
eral is favorable to businesses and hostile to unionization. “High-union-
density states” have union densities over 15 percent and no right-to-work
laws (union density is the percentage of the labor force belonging to
S o u rc e : Data from Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and
E a rnings Data Book: Compilations from the Current Population Survey 1996 Edition
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1996), Table 8.
S o u rc e : Data from Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and
E a rnings Data Book: Compilations from the Current Population Survey 1996 Edition
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1996), Table 8.
Figure 1  States by State Type
Figure 2  Union Density by StateRight-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and the Minimum Wage
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unions). A third category covers the remaining states, which are neither
right-to-work nor high-union-density. In 1996 most of the right-to-work
states had relatively low union density (15 out of 21 had union densities
below 9.9 percent and 5 out of 21 had union densities between 10.0 and
13.6)—most likely because of a legal climate that makes unionization dif-
ficult. Only one right-to-work state had a union density over 13.6 perc e n t
(Nevada with 20.2 percent). Even in high-union-density states, density
does not reach 30 percent; in 1996 the highest union density was about
28 percent (in New York). In the remaining states, union densities range
f rom 9.3 to 14.9 percent. Figure 1 shows states by type. Notice that right-
to-work states are concentrated in the South and in the West (excluding
the Pacific states). Figure 2 shows states by union density. Comparing
F i g u res 1 and 2 confirms that right-to-work legislation, with few excep-
tions, tends to coincide with low union density.
One might object that states could be more simply categorized as low or
high union density without regard to right-to-work laws. It is certainly
t rue that right-to-work states have, for the most part, low union 
densities, but low union density by itself does not capture the spirit of a
political, legal, and economic stru c t u re that is hostile to unions. The
object of this paper is to demonstrate that states that have laws that
make unionization difficult tend to have lower wages than high-union-
density states and that, because wages are lower, the minimum wage
appears to have greater significance in determining wage stru c t u re in
right-to-work states.
When the minimum wage is conceived as a range of wages, the popula-
tion of workers that we are dealing with naturally increases. In 1940, 0.4
p e rcent of employed heads of household earned exactly the statutory
minimum wage; after 1940, no head of a household earned the statutory
minimum. These statistics appear to support the view that the minimum
wage is not an important issue because primary earners do not have min-
imum wage jobs. However, in 1940, 29.9 percent of employed heads of
household earned around the minimum wage (see Table 2). This
strengthens the argument that research and debate about the effects of
the minimum wage have been too narrowly focused.
It is true that the percentage of workers earning around the minimum
wage has been declining over time—in all states (from 29.9 in 1940 toDo Institutions Affect the Wage Stru c t u re ?
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14.2 in 1990) and within right-to-work and high-union-density states
(see Figures 3 and 4).2 It is also true, however, that in right-to-work
states the percentage of workers who earn around the minimum wage is
substantially higher than the national average and in high-union-
density states the percentage is lower. Although the gap between state
types has narrowed from 1940 to 1990, it was still significant in 1990.
This fact is especially important because the 1980s was a period of inten-
sive  economic  development,  especially  in  the  South,  where 
e v e ry state has right-to-work laws. The eff o rts at development were
designed to replace low-wage and low-skilled industries with higher-
wage industries (Wright 1986; Schulman 1991). Development alone,
however, was insufficient to bring the percentage of the labor force earn-
ing around the minimum wage down to the level prevailing in high-
union-density states. After years of economic development the portion
of heads of household earning around the minimum wage in 1990 was
still 35.5 percent (4.4 percentage points) higher in right-to-work than in
high-union-density states.
Table 3 shows that, among employed heads of household, the age gro u p
with the highest percentage earning around the minimum wage is the 25 to
34 group, and within that age group the percentage of those earning aro u n d
Table 2 Percentage of Employed Heads of Household Earning around the
Minimum Wage, by State Type*
Difference  Difference Difference  Difference
between RTW between HUD between HUD  between RTW
and All States and All States and RTW  and HUD as a
(Percentage (Percentage (Percentage percentage
Year All RTW  Points) HUD Points) Points) of HUD
1940 29.9 37.0 7.1 26.7 –3.2 10.3 38.6
1950 28.4 36.2 7.8 24.6 –3.8 11.6 47.2
1960 19.3 26.5 7.2 15.7 –3.6 10.8 68.8 
1970 17.0 22.8 5.8 13.8 –3.2 9.0 58.0
1980 19.7 23.7 4.0 17.3 –2.4 6.4 37.0
1990 14.2 16.8 2.6 12.4 –1.8 4.4 35.5
* RTW, right-to-work states; HUD, high-union-density states
Note: On the basis of chi-square tests, all differences are significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
“Around the minimum wage” is defined as the minimum wage plus or minus 50 percent of the minimum.
Source: Author’s calculations from census data from the IPUMS [Steven Ruggles and Matthew Sobek et
al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 2.0 (Minneapolis: Historical Census Projects, University
of Minnesota, 1997)].Right-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and the Minimum Wage
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the minimum wage is higher in right-to-work states than in high-union-
density states. The percentage of heads of household earning around the
minimum wage in the 18 to 24 group increases over time, but most heads
of household earning around the minimum wage are 25 years and older.
Figure 3 Percentage of Employed Heads of Household Earning around
the Minimum Wage, 1940
Note: See table in note 2 for data by state (Hawaii and Alaska were not states in 1940).
Source: Data from the IPUMS [Steven Ruggles and Matthew Sobek et al., Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series: Version 2.0 (Minneapolis: Historical Census Projects, University of
Minnesota, 1997)].
Note: See table in note 2 for data by state.
Source: Data from the IPUMS [Steven Ruggles and Matthew Sobek et al., Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series: Version 2.0 (Minneapolis: Historical Census Projects, University of
Minnesota, 1997)].
Figure 4  Percentage of Employed Heads of Household Earning around
the Minimum Wage, 1990Do Institutions Affect the Wage Stru c t u re ?
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Educational attainment among workers in the sample increases over
time irrespective of state type. Those with fewer years of education
appear to be more likely to earn around the minimum wage. The educa-
tional level of those earning around the minimum wage is lower in the
right-to-work states than in the high-union-density states. It might be
a rgued that overall educational attainment is lower in right-to-work
states than in high-union-density states and that is sufficient explana-
tion for why more people earn around the minimum wage in those
states. However, although a low educational level is likely to predispose
one to earning around the minimum wage, a statistical analysis suggests
that other factors are involved.
In an earlier study, I used a logistical re g ression analysis to determ i n e
which factors—educational level, industry, or state type—yield a gre a t e r
Table 3 Employed Heads of Household Earning around the Minimum Wage
in Right-to-Work (RTW) States and High-Union-Density (HUD) States,
by Age and Education 
1940 1950  1960 1970 1980 1990
RTW HUD RTW HUD RTW HUD RTW HUD RTW HUD RTW HUD
Age
0–17 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
18–24 12.0 11.5 15.8 12.5 19.7 18.6 24.4 25.4  24.5 23.5 18.4 19.2
25–34 33.2 25.0 26.7 23.1 22.1 18.3 19.0 16.9 27.8 27.9 25.3 23.7
35–44 25.6 23.9 25.3 20.1 19.2 16.3 15.4 12.9 14.1 13.9 18.0 17.4
45–54 17.6 23.2 17.2 19.5 19.6 18.0 17.4 18.9 13.2 12.4 12.7 11.7
55–64 8.8 14.8 10.9 17.4 13.9 17.8 4.6 7.0 13.3 14.1 13.3 13.3
65–72 2.3 3.6 3.3 6.2 4.1 8.3 1.5 2.7 5.4 6.1 8.4 10.2
73+ 0.4 0.7 0.6 1.2  1.1 2.5 0.6 1.3 1.6 1.9 3.7 4.3
Education
1st–11th grade 84.2 82.9 78.8 72.1 70.3 63.8 57.5 47.4 37.9 30.1 36.9 28.7 
12th grade 10.0 11.4 13.5 18.5 19.3 21.9 25.9 30.1 36.7 38.8 45.4 47.9
Some college 3.7 3.5 4.7 5.7 6.8  8.7 10.9 13.8 16.4 18.8 5.4 7.0
4 years of college 1.6 1.4 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.9 3.7 4.6 5.3 6.6 8.8 11.0
More than 4 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.3 2.6 2.1 4.1 1.5 2.9 3.4 5.4
years of college
Source: Author’s calculations from census data from the IPUMS [Steven Ruggles and Matthew Sobek et al.,
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 2.0 (Minneapolis: Historical Census Projects, University of
Minnesota, 1997)].Right-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and the Minimum Wage
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l i k e l i h o od of earning around the minimum wage (Levin-Wa l d m a n
1999a). Workers in manufacturing are less likely than those in other
industries to earn around the minimum wage. The likelihood of earn i n g
a round the minimum wage in other industries varies over time. For
instance, retail workers were less likely to earn around the minimum wage
in 1940 than they have been since 1960. Both wholesale trade and con-
s t ruction workers were more likely to earn around the minimum wage in
1940 than they have been since 1960. And workers in right-to-work
states were more likely to earn around the minimum wage than those in
high-union-density states throughout the period from 1940 to 1990.
Of course, if educational levels are generally lower in right-to-work
states, it would follow that workers in those states are more likely to earn
around the minimum wage. But when educational factors are controlled
f o r, workers in right-to-work states still have a greater probability of
earning around the minimum wage than workers in high-union-density
states, and this pattern remains consistent throughout the period (Levin-
Waldman 1999a). Although low educational attainment is likely to be
the most important determinant of who earns around the minimum
wage, workers with little education in right-to-work states are at least
two to three times more likely to earn around the minimum wage than
those with little education in high-union-density states.
Although workers in some industries are more likely to earn around the
minimum wage than workers in other industries, the question remains as
to whether the location of industries in certain types of states affects the
likelihood of earning around the minimum wage. Industry demographics
show there to be no real diff e rence among industries in distribution
between right-to-work and high-union-density states (Levin-Wa l d m a n
1999a). There is no evidence of a saturation of any specific industries
that might result in the depression of wages.
Even in an industry such as manufacturing, in which there is a lower
probability of earning around the minimum wage, there is a greater like-
lihood of earning around the minimum wage if the industry is located in
a right-to-work state than if it is not. By 1990 manufacturing workers in
right-to-work states still had a greater probability of earning around the
minimum wage than manufacturing workers in high-union-density
states, even though that diff e rence was not as great as it was in 1940. Do Institutions Affect the Wage Stru c t u re ?
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It might be argued that this is due to differences in types of manufactur-
ing in high-union-density versus right-to-work states. The diminishing
probability of earning around the minimum wage may be a testament to
the growth of high-wage and high-technology industries in many right-
to-work states, especially where much of the economic growth was due
to huge defense spending. There were fewer low-wage industries in 1990
than in 1940, but this cannot fully explain the differences between right-
to-work and high-union-density states. Despite capital flight from the
northeastern and midwestern industrial belts, which greatly contributed
to the decline in unionism, there was little change in the negative
effects of manufacturing on the probability of earning around the mini-
mum wage in high-union-density states from 1940 to 1990.
The Minimum Wa ge as a Means to Ach i eve a More Equ i ta b l e
D i st ribution of Income
Labor market institutions that affect wages, such as unions and the mini-
mum wage, are likely to have important effects on wage structure, espe-
cially on the range of wages around the minimum and in communities
where wages have traditionally been lower. Where unions are difficult to
organize, that is, in right-to-work states, the minimum wage becomes, in
e ffect, the only labor market institution that can prop up wages, espe-
cially for those at the bottom of the wage stru c t u re. As James K.
Galbraith suggests, the minimum wage and unions give workers a degree
of market power they otherwise would not have: “Minimum wage laws
can move people en masse from the crowded first floor toward the sec-
ond or third in our wage building” (1998, 61). That states passed laws to
make unionization difficult implies that the legislatures in those states
seek to maintain employers’ share of income at the expense of workers’
share and that they will resist minimum wage legislation. It should also
be re m e m b e red that whereas right-to-work laws are promulgated fro m
within the states, the federal minimum wage and its periodic adjust-
ments are imposed from without and are viewed as an interference with
states’ rights. It may be for this reason alone that the minimum wage is
resisted in the public policy debate.
Nevertheless, issues of equity across states need to be addressed. The fact
that wages are lower in right-to-work states implies that a wage floorRight-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and the Minimum Wage
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could have a greater impact there. One of the possible reasons that
northern industrial states, most of which are high-union-density states,
historically have favored increases in the minimum wage (Schulman
1991; Wright 1986) could be that they will force up wages in other parts
of the country, which could make capital movement to other regions less
attractive. Much of the initial debate over the establishment of a federal
minimum wage focused on whether the minimum should take into
account regional cost-of-living diff e rentials. The Roosevelt administra-
tion, backed by organized labor and those business interests that were in
favor of the wage floor, refused to incorporate diff e rentials. Applying
cost-of-living differentials to the minimum was opposed out of a belief
that imposing a wage floor, which might have a disproportionately nega-
tive effect on some regions, would force those regions, such as the South,
to modernize (Schulman 1991). Many of these states, rather than mod-
ernizing, passed right-to-work laws for the express purpose of hindering
the development of unions in an effort to maintain lower wages. Today,
t h e re are still no regional diff e rences in the minimum wage; states
are free to establish a minimum wage above the federal wage floor, but
not below.
Regional diff e rences might suggest the need to think about how the
minimum wage could be used to equalize wage disparities between the
states. From a national perspective, there is no gain when one state
l u res industry away from another, especially if the federal govern m e n t
is re q u i red to bear the burden of providing assistance to regions that
lose industry to low-wage states. One policy option would be to
attempt to avoid exacerbating disparities by, for example, raising the
minimum wage in high-union-density states, where the gap between
the statutory minimum wage and the median hourly wage is consider-
ably gre a t e r. Although this strategy might have the virtue of narro w i n g
the earnings gap between workers in high-union-density states, it
would widen wage disparities between state types and could also lead to
the creation (or exacerbation) of high-road and low-road states. High-
road states would have a higher minimum wage and would attract
industries with more high-skilled jobs and higher wages, while low-
road states would attract firms offering lower-paying, lower-skilled jobs.
The opposite response to wage diff e rentials between states could 
be taken by having an even higher minimum wage in those states 
w h e re wage rates are lower so as to reduce whatever incentive may stillDo Institutions Affect the Wage Stru c t u re ?
Public Policy Brief a22 a22
remain for firms to relocate from high-union-density states to right-to-
work states in search of low wages. But such a policy is not likely to be
politically feasible.
Neither of these options ought to be pursued; there should continue to
be a uniform federal minimum wage, but it should be raised. The mini-
mum wage should not be used to equalize disparities between states, but
to create a more equitable distribution of income throughout the coun-
t ry. By demonstrating that labor market institutions like the minimum
wage and unions can force wages up—through various contours—it is
hoped to show that a minimum wage can help increase the income of a
b road segment of low-wage workers. If a higher minimum wage can
increase the incomes of a large segment of the low-income population, it
will substantially help to create a more equal and more equitable distrib-
ution of income. To the extent that raising the minimum wage will
increase incomes for those at the bottom of the wage scale and will exert
upward pressure on incomes of those earning around it, the income gap
between those at the top and the bottom will narrow. Because wages of
those at the top of the distribution are substantially above the minimum
wage, it is doubtful minimum wage increases would exert any upward
pressure on them. The primary beneficiaries of minimum wage increases
would be those at and near the bottom of the income distribution. This
c o n j e c t u re is consistent with literature suggesting that the declining
value of the minimum wage in recent years has been a contributing fac-
tor to growing wage inequality (D. Gordon 1996; Palley 1998; Galbraith
1998; Fortin and Lemieux 1997).
I have put forth several theoretical reasons why wages might be set not
by perfectly competitive markets but by institutions. If we as a society
would like to narrow the earnings gap and achieve a more equitable
income distribution, labor market institutions, which historically have
been used to stabilize wages, need to be revitalized. If policies such as
right-to-work laws have the effect of maintaining low wages and 
widening the earnings gap, then other policies, such as the minimum
wage, can have a counteracting effect and, perhaps, narrow that
gap. Although the minimum wage has diff e rent effects in diff e re n t
states, which may be of concern to state and local policymakers, the
national policymaker ought to remain region neutral (admittedly, a
d i fficult task).Right-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and the Minimum Wage
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The discussion thus far suggests why the minimum wage engenders the
type of antagonism it often does and why that antagonism is more
intense in some regions of the country than others. The minimum wage
itself is not as important as the effect it has on the wage contours around
it, an effect that is greater in states with lower wages, such as right-to-
work states. The fact that political opposition to the minimum wage and
to increases in it has always been greater in the South and other right-
to-work states, in which more workers earn around the minimum wage,
suggests that the minimum wage has a greater impact on the distribution
of income in those states and that there is a political interest in main-
taining the existing wage structure. Moreover, the findings that the min-
imum wage has more impact in some states than others also suggests that
the institutional stru c t u re within a state does affect wages. There f o re ,
the minimum wage can be conceived of in broader terms as an institu-
tion that can affect wage stru c t u re and there f o re income distribution.
The minimum wage must go beyond the narrow focus of employment
consequences versus poverty benefits to those who earn the statutory
minimum wage. That the debate has taken this narrow focus is perhaps
less a statement of the weaknesses of the minimum wage as a policy than
a testament to the strength of those interests that benefit from maintain-
ing such a narrow focus.
The minimum wage should, there f o re, be used to obtain a more equi-
table income distribution. The minimum wage would be a more effective
tool for achieving a more equitable income distribution if it were tied to
an automatic adjustment mechanism such as a productivity index
(Levin-Waldman 1998b). An increase in the minimum wage to $7.25 an
hour may not have as detrimental an effect as predicted by competitive
market theory, but it would have a profound effect on the wages of peo-
ple at the low end of the distribution of income. A higher minimum
wage is in line with many living wage movements around the country
(Pollin and Luce 1998) and may not greatly affect employment in small
businesses (Levin-Waldman and McCarthy 1998, Levin-Wa l d m a n
1999b). The minimum wage should be boosted to $7.25 and then
indexed to a productivity index there a f t e r. Although this would not
completely reverse the pattern of growing wage inequality since the
1970s, it would be a positive step in that direction.
a23Do Institutions Affect the Wage Stru c t u re ?
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Note s
1. Exemptions to the minimum wage law allow workers in some occupations to
earn less than the minimum. For example, workers who earn tips in the restau-
rant industry have a lower legislated minimum wage and certain industries (for
example, some with sales below a certain threshold) are exempt from the mini-
mum wage law.
2. The percentages of employed heads of household earning around the mini-
mum wage by state are given in the following table.
State                              1940     1990 State 1940      1990
Alabama 39.1  17.1  Louisiana 38.6  17.8
Alaska — 13.1  Maine 41.2  15.5
Arizona 32.3  16.4  Maryland 31.4  9.3 
Arkansas 36.9  20.5  Massachusetts 27.1  11.3 
California 26.2  13.0  Michigan 23.1  12.0 
Colorado 34.8  15.8  Minnesota 29.1  13.9 
Connecticut 25.1  8.6  Mississippi 35.9 22.5 
Delaware 27.1  14.7 Missouri 32.4  17.0 
District of Columbia 22.8  12.6  Montana 31.6  19.4 
Florida 40.8  17.0  Nebraska 36.5  17.3 
Georgia 38.5  18.4  Nevada 25.8 13.7
Hawaii — 13.4  New Hampshire 39.0  12.0 
Idaho 38.7  19.6  New Jersey 22.4  9.2 
Illinois 26.8  12.0  New Mexico 34.7  19.5 
Indiana 31.1  13.3  New York 24.6  12.0 
Iowa 33.9  16.8  North Carolina 45.2  17.2 
Kansas 32.4  15.7  North Dakota 39.3  20.4 
Kentucky 36.6  12.8  Ohio 26.3  12.4
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